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COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA AND OUR EVOLVING
"CONSTITUTION": PLAYING PEEK-A-BOO WITH THE
STANDARD OF SCRUTINY FOR SEX-BASED
CLASSIFICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"), founded in 1839 and
located in Lexington, Virginia, is the first state-supported college in
the United States.' With an enrollment of about 1,300 male ca-
dets,2 all of whom live in barracks,3 the all-male military
institute's mission is "to produce educated and honorable men,..
ready as citizen-soldiers to defend their country in time of national
peril."4 VMI's educational method is based on the "adversative"
model. It emphasizes "[p]hysical rigor, mental stress, absolute
equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of
behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values." Under the inten-
sive VMI program, new cadets, called "rats," are subjected to a
process known as the "rat line," "an extreme form of the adver-
sative model," designed to exact a level of physical rigor and
1. See Brian Scott Yablonski, Marching to the Beat of a Different Drummer: The
Case of the Virginia Military Institute, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1993).
2. See United States v. Virginia, 766 F.Supp. 1414, 1423 (W.D. Va. 1991), vacated,
976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub. nom. Virginia Military Inst. v. United
States, 113 S.Ct. 2431 (1993).
3. Barrack life is viewed as crucial to the VMI experience. See id. at 1423.
4. Id. at 1425. Despite the military focus of VMI's program, only about 15% of its
cadets actually pursue a career in military service. See id. at 1432.
5. Id. at 1421.
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mental stress comparable to the Marine Corp's boot camp.6 In
addition, VMI cadets are subjected to a rigid hierarchical "class
system" composed of privileges and responsibilities, 7 an all-encom-
passing honor code,' and a pervasive military system of regula-
tions, etiquette, and drill.9 Finally, the VMI experience includes a
"dyke system" that operates in conjunction with the rat line and
assigns to each "rat" a mentor, or "dyke," in order to facilitate
cross-class bonding and to provide guidance and support.' By
1996, VMI was the only remaining single-sex public college or
university in Virginia." Then came the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Virginia 2 ("VMI"), which held that VMI's
male-only admissions policy-a policy that had remained constant
for over 150 years-violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 3
This Comment focuses on the VMI decision and explores what
it portends for the Court's sex-based equal protection jurisprudence.
Part I traces the history of the VMI litigation and analyzes the
VMI majority opinion. Part H argues that VMI represents the
Court's final step to strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications. In
order to demonstrate how VMI has the potential to significantly
disrupt the political process in the future, Part Il tests the constitu-
tionality of the military's combat exclusion rules under the
VMI analysis. In conjunction with this analysis, Part IV examines
how the Court's military deference doctrine collides with VMI and
explores the implications this may have for the Court's sex-based
equal protection jurisprudence. Finally, Part V draws a parallel
between VMI and the Court's 1970's sex-based equal protection
jurisprudence, both of which represent the Court derailing the polit-
ical process all under the guise of the "Constitution."
6. See id. at 1422.
7. See id. at 1422-23.
8. See Virginia, 766 F.Supp. at 1423. The VMI honor code provides that a cadet
"does not lie, cheat, steal, nor tolerate those who do." Id. The honor code is "stringently
enforced," with the solitary remedy being expulsion. See id.
9. See id. at 1424.
10. See id.
11. By the mid-1970's, all of Virginia's public, single-sex colleges and universities had
become coeducational, except for VMI. See id. at 1418-19.
12. 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter VMI].
13. See id. at 2269.
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I. VMI EVOLVES WrrH THE TIms
A. The Beginning of the End
The VMI case traces its genesis to 1990. Prompted by a letter
from a female high school student who sought admission to VI,
the United States Department of Justice sued the Commonwealth of
Virginia and VMI, claiming that VMI's male-only admissions poli-
cy violated the equal protection clause of the United States Consti-
tution. 4 In siding with VMI, the district court relied on the Su-
preme Court's heightened scrutiny jurisprudence for sex-based
classifications, especially Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan.15
Hogan places upon the state the burden of "showing at least that
the classification serves 'important-governmental objectives and that
the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.""..6  The district court held that
VMI's single-sex program is "an important educational objective"
that yields significant educational benefits. One of the program's
primary benefits, the court said, was to add "a measure of diversity
to Virginia's overall system of education that would be missing if
VMI were coeducational."17 Consequently, Virginia satisfied the
second prong of the Hogan test since the only means of achieving
14. See id. at 2271. Several attempts at employing the political process to effectuate a'
change in VMI's admissions policy were unsuccessful. See rlliam Devan, Note, Toward
a New Standard in Gender Discrimination: The Case of Virginia Military Institute, 33
WM. & MARY L. REV. 489, 496 (1992).
15. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Hogan involved the Mississippi University for Women
("MUW"), a state-supported university that denied admission to a male who sought to
enroll in the university's all female nursing program. See id. at 720. Mississippi argued
that the nursing school's single-sex admissions policy was designed to compensate for
discrimination against women. See id. at 727. The Court, applying intermediate scrutiny,
held that Mississippi's program violated the equal protection clause. See id. at 731. It
emphasized that the state must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
the sex-based classification, id. at 724, and found that MUW's single-sex policy was not
designed for compensatory purposes but rather "to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
nursing as an exclusively woman's job." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729. Moreover, the state's
sex-based classification was not substantially related to its compensatory objective since
males could audit classes at the nursing school, thus refuting Mississippi's claim that the
full admission of men would adversely affect the educational environment. See id. at 730-
31.
16. Id. at 724 (citing Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150 (1980)).
17. Virginia, 766 F.Supp. at 1415. The district court added that "[tihe diversity is
further enhanced by VMI's unique method of instruction which was applauded by all of
the educational experts who testified [at trial]." Id.
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the educational objective is to maintain VMI's all-male status. 8
The district court found "that key elements of the adversative VMI
educational system, with its focus on barracks life, would be fun-
damentally altered, and the distinctive ends of the system would be
thwarted, if VMI were forced to admit females and to make chang-
es necessary to accommodate their needs and interests."' 9
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judg-
ment. While it agreed with the district court that VMI's unique
methodology would be substantially altered by coeducation," it
disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the program
advanced the state's policy of encouraging diversity. In the Fourth
Circuit's view, the state policy of encouraging diversity could not
be reconciled with the fact that the unique educational benefit
provided by VMI is available only to males.2 The Fourth Circuit
thus remanded the case in order to allow Virginia to devise a
remedial course of action, offering three options in particular. (1)
admit women to VMI and adjust the program accordingly, (2)
establish parallel institutions or programs, or (3) abandon state
support of VMI, while allowing VMI to pursue its policies on a
private scale.2
Virginia responded with a proposed state-supported, all-female
version of VMI at Mary Baldwin College, a private liberal arts
institution for women. The proposed program, called Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL"), would share VMI's
underlying mission of producing "citizen-soldiers." 23 Yet unlike
VMI, the proposed program would offer fewer academic cour-
ses,24 use a different educational method,' and employ "a facul-
18. See id.
19. Id. at 1411.
20. In particular, the Fourth Circuit agreed that at a minimum "three aspects of VMI's
program-physical training, the absence of privacy, and the adversative approach-would
be materially affected by coeducation, leading to a substantial change in the egalitarian
ethos that is a critical aspect of VMI's training." United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890,
896-97 (4th Cir. 1992).
21. See id. at 899. If diversity was indeed the justification for the all-male policy at
VMI, the Fourth Circuit found it problematic that Virginia had not explained the move-
ment toward coeducation in all other public colleges and universities in Virginia. See id.
22. See id. at 900.
23. United States v. Virginia, 852 F.Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994).
24. See id. at 477.
25. Most notably, VWIL would not employ VMI's "adversative" method. Rather,
VWIL would follow a "cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem rather than the
leveling process used by VMI." Id. at 476. In the opinion of one educational expert, "an
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ty holding significantly fewer Ph.D's than the faculty at VMI." 6
Despite the differences between VMI and VWLL, the district court
ruled in favor of VMI.27 The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding the
educational institutions to be "substantively comparable" and thus
consistent with equal protection.28 The Supreme Court, however,
in a 7-1 decision,29 dismissed the lower court holdings and held
that both VMI's all-male admissions policy and Virginia's proposed
remedy violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Court's United States v. Virginia decision was one of the
most significant equal protection cases decided during its 1995-96
Term.3" Some commentators have hailed the decision as "a water-
shed decision for women's rights."31 Other Court watchers, how-
ever, have criticized VM1 as yet another example of the Court's
unrestrained judicial activism.32 Justice Scalia noted as much in
dissent when he lamented that the Court had, once again, narrowed
the sphere of self-government.33
Feminists were no doubt elated to learn that the VMI majority
opinion was written by Justice Ginsburg, especially given her past
equal protection advocacy.34 In ruling against VMI, Justice
adversative method of teaching in an all-female school would be not only inappropriate
for most women, but counterproductive." Id.
26. Id. at 502. Sixty-eight percent of Mary Baldwin's faculty hold Ph.Ds, whereas 86%
of VMI's faculty hold such degrees. See id.
27. See id. at 473.
28. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1241 (4th Cir. 1995).
29. Justice Thomas recused himself, as his son attends VMI. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Decisions Expand Equal Protection Rights, NAT'L L. J., July 29, 1996, at C7.
30. Another significant decision was Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996), which
declared Colorado's anti-homosexual state constitutional amendment unconstitutional.
31. Margo L. Ely, Court's VMI Decision Reinforces Review Standard for Sex Bias,
Cm. DAILY L. BuLLETIN., July 8, 1996, at 6.
32. See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Jr., Is Judicial Restraint Dead?, NJ. LJ., Aug. 26, 1996,
at S-1 (questioning whether we have "all implicitly decided that Herbert Wechsler was
just plain wrong when he wrote in 1959 that the Court should never be a mere 'naked
power organ,' freely substituting its policy preferences for those of elected representa-
tives").
33. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2308 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 31, at 6 ("When the Supreme Court's VMI decision was
announced ... I suspect that I was not alone in breathing a sigh of relief-and experi-
encing an excited rush of adrenaline--upon hearing the simple fact that Justice Ginsburg
was the author"). Indeed, Ruth Bader Ginsburg has long advocated heightened scrutiny for
sex-based classifications and in fact drafted the ACLU brief in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), which urged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications. See
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Ginsburg considered the two justifications advanced by Virginia to
support the male-only educational program. First, Virginia argued
that single-sex educational programs provide "important educational
benefits"'35 and promote "diversity in educational approaches, 36
and thereby advance a legitimate and important governmental ob-
jective.37  Second, Virginia argued that the admission and
accommodation of women at VMI would drastically modify its
unique adversative method of training. VIl's mission, therefore,
could only be accomplished through a single-sex environment. 8
In rejecting Virginia's justifications, Justice Ginsburg began by
emphasizing the "exceedingly persuasive justification" that govern-
mental actors must advance to justify sex-based classifications.39
Justice Ginsburg explained that beginning with Reed v. Reed,"
the Court's case law has "evolved 4 to the point that the burden
is now on the state to demonstrate "at least that the [challenged]
classification serves 'important governmental objectives and that the
discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives.' ' 42 Moreover, the state's justifica-
tion must be "genuine," as opposed to being "hypothesized or
invented post hoc in response to litigation" and it must not rely on
"overbroad generalizations" or stereotypes about the differences
between men and women.43
Justice Ginsburg was careful to note that under the Court's
jurisprudence, governmental classifications based on sex are subject
only to "heightened review,"'  as the Court has "thus far" re-
served strict scrutiny for classifications based on race or national
origin.45 Consequently, while the state is prohibited from perpetu-
Collin O'Connor Udell, Note, Signalling A New Direction in Gender Classification: United
States v. Virginia, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 521, 525 (1996).
35. Cross-Petitioner's Brief at 20-21, United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996)
(Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107).
36. Id. at 25.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 33-36.
39. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2274.
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Justice Ginsburg makes parenthetical reference to the "evolving" case law of the
Court since 1971 respecting sex-based classifications. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2275.
42. Id. at 2275 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724) (emphasis added).
43. See id. at 2275.
44. Id. at 2276.
45. See id. at 2275 n.6.
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ating the inferiority of women in legal, social, and economic
spheres,46 it may draw sex-based classifications47 to promote
equal opportunity in employment,' or "to advance full develop-
ment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people." 49 In the
end, Justice Ginsburg found, Virginia failed to show an "'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' for excluding all women from the
citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI.' 5
In noting that Virginia's claims of beneficial educational
opportunities and diversity were uncontested in the case, Justice
Ginsburg undertook a "searching analysis" of the relation between
Virginia's alleged objective and its actual purpose. 1 Under the
Court's jurisprudence, a "close resemblance" is demanded between
a state's "alleged objective" and its "actual purpose underlying the
discriminatory classification."'52 Placing this "actual purpose" tem-
plate over Virginia's alleged objective, Justice Ginsburg found no
persuasive evidence in the record that supported Virginia's asserted
interest in promoting educational diversity. 3 In essence, Virginia's
alleged interest was seen as a pretext for sexual discrimination
against women. Specifically, Justice Ginsburg pointed to the histor-
ical record in Virginia that revealed that all of the state's other
public colleges and universities, except for VI, had abandoned
single-sex educational programs. 4 Justice Ginsburg argued that
"[a] purpose genuinely to advance an array of educational op-
tions ... is not served by VMI's historic and constant plan [of an
all-male educational program because] [h]owever 'liberally' this
plan serves the State's sons, it makes no provision whatever for
her daughters. That is not equal protection." 5
46. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that physical differences between men and women
still prevail, and that inherent differences between the sexes "remain cause for celebration,
but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an
individual's opportunity." VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2276.
47. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam).
48. See California Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987).
49. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2276.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 2277 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727). In Hogan, for example, the Court
found no close resemblance between Mississippi's alleged objective of conducting "educa-
tional affirmative education" to compensate women for discrimination (as its justification
for maintaining an all-female nursing school) and Mississippi's actual purpose. Hogan, 458
U.S. at 730.
52. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2277 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730).
53. See id. at 2279.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 2279. Justice Ginsburg also referred to a VMi Mission Study Committee that
11271997]
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In similar fashion, Justice Ginsburg rejected Virginia's argu-
ment that admitting women to VMI would drastically modify (so
as to destroy) the adversative method of training that uniquely
characterizes VMIL. Justice Ginsburg conceded that the admission of
women to VI would require accommodations in housing and
physical training for female cadets. However, she also noted that it
is indisputable that at least some women would like to attend VMI
and that at least some women have the capabilities-physical and
otherwise-to perform all of VMI's required activities.56 The dis-
trict court had made findings on sex-based developmental differ-
ences, but Justice Ginsburg disregarded them. In Justice Ginsburg's
view, those findings simply "restate the opinions of Virginia's
expert witnesses, opinions about typically male or typically female
'tendencies."' 57 Justice Ginsburg argued that even assuming that
most women would not choose VMI's adversative method, the real
reexamined, from October 1983 until May 1986, VMI's all-male admissions policy in
light of Hogan. Justice Ginsburg found that "[wihatever internal purpose the Mission
Study Committee served-and however well-meaning the framers of the report were-we
can hardly extract from that effort any state policy evenhandedly to advance diverse edu-
cational options." Id. at 2279. Justice Scalia, in dissent, criticized the majority's charge
that Virginia's perpetuation of VMI's all-male policy was simply a "pretext" for sexual
discrimination, arguing that the majority would have to impute such a motive to the Mis-
sion Study Committee. Id. at 2298. Justice Scalia argued that "whether it is part of the
evidence to prove that diversity was the Commonwealth's objective . . . is quite separate
from whether it is part of the evidence to prove that anti-feminism was not" and the
Committee's mere creation and its study and analysis "utterly refute the claim that VMI
elected to maintain its all-male study-body composition for some misogynistic reason." Id.
Justice Scalia also sharply criticized Justice Ginsburg's claim that there was no evidence
in the record supporting Virginia's interest in diversity, arguing that a 1990 Report of the
Virginia Commission on the University of the 21st Century to the Governor and General
Assembly, a source stipulated by the parties, specifically "notes that the hallmarks of
Virginia's educational policy are 'diversity and autonomy."' Id. at 2299 (citation omitted).
56. See id. at 2279. That is, "'neither the goal of producing citizen-soldiers,' VMI's
raison d'etre, 'nor VMI's implementing methodology is inherently unsuitable to women."'
Il (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
57. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2279. On this point, Justice Scalia was extremely critical of the
Court. With obvious disdain, he said:
How remarkable to criticize the District Court on the ground that its findings
rest on the evidence (i.e., the testimony of Virginia's witnesses)! That is what
findings are supposed to do . . .The Court simply dispenses with the evidence
submitted at trial-it never says that a single finding of the District Court is
clearly erroneous-in favor of the Justices' own view of the world. . . . It is
not too much to say that this approach to the case has rendered the trial a
sham.
Id. at 2300-01 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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issue is whether Virginia "can constitutionally deny women who
have the will and capacity, the training and attendant opportunities
that V uniquely affords."58 On that basis, it was "hardly
proved" that women would destroy Viv's adversative method.59
In Justice Ginsburg's assessment, such a prediction was more
consonant with other self-fulfilling prophecies that had been used
to deny women rights and opportunities in the past.' It was clear-
ly inconsistent with the success of women in federal military acad-
emies or their effective participation in our country's military ser-
vices-both indicating that "[Virginia's] justification for excluding
all women from 'citizen-solider' training for which some are quali-
fied ... cannot rank as 'exceedingly persuasive."''6  Ultimately,
then, Justice Ginsburg found that VMI's underlying mission of
producing "citizen-soldiers" was a great enough goal to accommo-
date women.62 Justice Ginsburg thus concluded that Virginia had
not established an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for its sex-
based classification.63
58. Id. at 2280 (emphasis added).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 2281. Justice Ginsburg explained that Virginia and VMI misconstrued the
Court's precedent-and in the process engaged in circular reasoning-when they focused
on "means" rather than "ends." In other words, VMI's single-sex educational policy was
claimed to be an "important governmental objective" and thus excluding women from
VMI was obviously "substantially related" since it was the only way to achieve the objec-
tive. By such reasoning, Justice Ginsburg argued, the Hogan test was "bent and bowed."
Id.
62. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2281. Justice Scalia, however, viewed the majority opinion
more as a bald public policy choice than a constitutional decision. This was made clear
in his dissent as he lambasted the VMI majority for choosing sides in the same-sex edu-
cational debate at VMI when it is clear that the Constitution, "the old one," as he put it,
leaves the controversy to the political process. Id. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Since
it is clear that the Constitution of the United States-the old one-takes no sides in this
educational debate, I dissent"). Indeed, while Justice Ginsburg was content to devote her
opinion "to deprecating the close-mindedness of our forbears," id. at 2291 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting), Justice Scalia pointed out that at least "they left us free to change." Id. at 2292
(Scalia, J., dissenting). However, "[tihe same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court,
which has embarked on a course of inscribing one after another of the current preferences
of society (and in some cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's
law-trained elite) in our Basic Law." Id.
63. See id. at 2282. Justice Ginsburg went on to reject VMI's remedial proposal of
establishing a separate "VMI" at Mary Baldwin College, arguing that Virginia did not
demonstrate "substantial equality" in the separate educational programs. See id. at 2285-86
(citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)). Justice Ginsburg contended that the
Fourth Circuit, which approved Virginia's remedial plan, was too deferential to the state,
and she explained that the proper standard for sex-based classifications is "heightened
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Curiously, Justice Ginsburg used the "exceedingly persuasive
justification" phraseology to state her conclusion instead of the
traditional "close and substantial relationship to important govern-
mental objectives" formulation of the intermediate scrutiny test.'
That particular choice of words implicates more than mere seman-
tics. In fact, those words may represent a substantive change in the
Court's sex-based equal protection jurisprudence. What precisely
was meant by the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" is
worthy of more detailed consideration.
HI. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: "EXCEEDINGLY" UNCLEAR?
The peculiar wording in Justice Ginsburg's VMI opinion has
generated much speculation over whether the Court is abandoning
intermediate scrutiny in favor of strict scrutiny for sex-based classi-
fications.' For instance, Justice Scalia argued that the majority
has "mudd[ied] the [constitutional] waters" by introducing "mis-
leading" statements in its equal protection analysis,' and has es-
sentially worked a drastic revision in established precedent respect-
ing sex-based classifications.67 Indeed, the United States, in its
brief before the Court, urged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny for
sex-based classifications. While Justice Ginsburg never expressly
referred to the Government's argument in her majority opinion,
several factors support Justice Scalia's contention that the Court
"effectively accept[ed]" the Government's position.68
scrutiny." Id. at 2286.
64. Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg's formula-
tion "introduc[es] potential confusion"). But see supra note 15 (noting a similar use of
language in Hogan).
65. The Court has, heretofore at least, reserved strict scrutiny for governmental "classi-
fications based on race or national origin and classifications affecting fundamental rights."
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (citations omitted). The early commentary on
VMI reveals the uncertainty stemming from Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion. See Cass
R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. Rsv. 6, 73 (1996) (VMI decision "heightens the level of scrutiny and brings it
closer to . . . 'strict scrutiny"); Martin A. Schwartz, Equal Protection Developments, N.Y.
LJ., July 17, 1996, at 3 (while not explicitly adopting strict scrutiny, VMI majority's
"equal protection analysis fairly resembles strict judicial scrutiny"); Ely, supra note 31, at
6 (VMI "indisputably adds bite to the well-established intermediate scrutiny standard ap-
plied to gender classifications").
66. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 2291.
68. See id. at 2294.
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The first factor centers on the manner in which the majority
formulated the equal protection test. Under the intermediate scruti-
ny test, a governmental classification must be "substantially related
to an important governmental objective." '69 While Justice Ginsburg
recited the intermediate scrutiny formulation two times in her anal-
ysis, she "never answer[ed] the question presented in anything
resembling that form [and] instead prefer[red] the phrase 'exceed-
ingly persuasive justification' from Hogan,"'7 Significantly, Justice
Ginsburg invoked the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification"
a total of nine times in her majority opinion." Justice Scalia re-
marked that this "would be unobjectionable if the Court acknowl-
edged that whether a 'justification' is 'exceedingly persuasive' must
be assessed by asking '[whether] the classification serves important
governmental objectives and [whether] the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."'"2 Unfortunately, as Justice Scalia, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in concurrence,73 pointed out, Justice Ginsburg used the
phrase as an expression of the test itself, thereby signaling a shift
in the equal protection standard.
Perhaps more important than the formulation of the test itself,
however, is the manner in which it was applied in the case-the
second, and stronger, factor supporting Justice Scalia's contention
that the majority had adopted a standard that "amounts to (at least)
strict scrutiny." '7 4 In reaching its decision, the majority argued that
VMI's all-male educational methodology failed the intermediate
scrutiny test because it is "not inherently unsuitable to women."75
In other words, some women could thrive under the adversative
69. See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984); Wengler, 446 U.S. at
150; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
70. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 2271, 2274, 2274, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2281, 2282, 2287.
72. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. As Chief Justice Rehnquist argued.
While terms like "important governmental objective" and "substantially related"
are hardly models of precision, they have more content and specificity than
does the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification." That phrase is best con-
fined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty of meeting the
applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself.
Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2279 (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 899).
113119971
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model.76 Yet as Justice Scalia correctly pointed out, intermediate
scrutiny is not governed by a least-restrictive-means analysis or
some "perfect fit" paradigm 77 While intermediate scrutiny de-
mands a closeness of fit between means and ends, the governmen-
tal classification need not satisfy the "narrowly tailored" test set
out in strict scrutiny cases.78 Rather, intermediate scrutiny is satis-
fied if the classification is "substantially related" to the achieve-
ment of the state's objectives;79 or, put another way, if the classi-
fication advances the governmental objective "in the aggregate. 80
The Court, applying intermediate scrutiny in the past, has upheld
sex-based classifications even though they were not perfect and did
not relate to characteristics holding true in every case.8 Thus, the
fact that a single woman, or even several women, are qualified to
participate at VMI would not by itself invalidate VMI's single-sex
educational program. This led Justice Scalia to object that "[o]nly
the amorphous 'exceedingly persuasive justification' phrase, and not
the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, can be made to
yield [the] conclusion that VMI's single-sex composition is uncon-
stitutional. '8
2
Despite Justice Scalia's protestations to the contrary, however,
there is no definitive evidence that the VMI majority has actually
pushed sex-based classifications into the strict scrutiny realm. In
fact, there is evidence in Justice Ginsburg's opinion weighing
against Justice Scalia's claims. For one thing, Justice Ginsburg
never invoked any "strict scrutiny" language in her opinion, nor
did she employ any "compelling interest" language. However, she
twice referred to and recited the "important governmental objec-
tive/substantial relationship" nomenclature. 83  Moreover, Justice
76. Id. (quoting Virginia, 976 F.2d at 896).
77. See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995).
79. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
80. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
81. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 81 (1981) (upholding male-only draft regis-
tration because even "assuming that a small number of women could be drafted for non-
combat roles, Congress simply did not consider it worth the added burdens of including
women in draft and registration plans"); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977)
(upholding Social Security Act provision providing higher benefits to women than men
because "women on the average received lower retirement benefits than men") (emphasis
added).
82. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 2271, 2275.
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Ginsburg explicitly stated that sex-based classifications warrant only
"heightened scrutiny," 4 not the strictest scrutiny. Finally, Justice
Ginsburg did not pioneer the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justifi-
cation" in VMI but instead extracted the phrase from several of the
Court's previous cases dealing with sex-based classifications.8 5 In
other words, Justice Ginsburg was not constructing a new constitu-
tional parlance; she was just manipulating the old.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why Justice Ginsburg
used the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" as an expres-
sion of the basic equal protection test itself, rather than as a de-
scription of the difficulty in satisfying the basic test.8 6 Moreover,
even if this part of Justice Ginsburg's opinion can be finessed
away, it is impossible to overlook several of Justice Ginsburg's
other statements. For example, Justice Ginsburg claimed that the
Court has, as of yet, simply declined the invitation to "equat[e]
gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on
race or national origin."8" Then, in a footnote, Justice Ginsburg
wrote that "[tihe Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial
scrutiny for classifications based on race or national origin."88 The
deceptive quality of these statements did not escape Justice Scalia,
who observed:
The wonderful thing about these statements is that they are
not actually false .... But the statements are misleading,
insofar as they suggest that we have not already categori-
cally held strict scrutiny to be inapplicable to sex-based
classifications. And the statements are irresponsible, insofar
as they are calculated to destabilize current law. Our task is
to clarify the law-not to muddy the waters, and not to
exact over-compliance by intimidation. The States and the
Federal Government... [should not be] compelled to
guess about the outcome of Supreme Court peek-a-boo. 9
84. Id. at 2286 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994)).
85. See J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1424; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
86. Justice Rehnquist was also perplexed by this. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2288
(Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
87. Id. at 2275.
88. VM!, 116 S.Ct. at 2275 n.6 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Peek-a-boo, indeed. While Justice Scalia overstates things a bit
when he says the Court has "categorically" disavowed strict scruti-
ny for sex-since the Court has expressly reserved that question on
three separate occasions 9 -the point is that the general under-
standing has been that intermediate scrutiny was the established
standard of review. This understanding has been undermined by
VMI.
The statements, formulations, and descriptions in the VMI ma-
jority opinion may presage the Court's final "evolution" to strict
scrutiny for sex-based classifications. The word "exceedingly"
suggests that, over time, the states and federal government will
have an increasingly heavy burden in justifying sex-based classifi-
cations. It is not unrealistic to expect that VM1 will be to strict
scrutiny what Reed v. Reed9 is to intermediate scrutiny. In Reed,
the Court struck down a sex-based classification by purportedly
applying rational basis review.92 Yet, as later cases confirmed,
Reed was in essence heralding in heightened scrutiny for sex.93
Thus, just as Reed was the esoteric instrument for establishing
intermediate scrutiny, so VMI may be the instrument for establish-
ing strict scrutiny.94 In this manner, the Court can make it appear
as if strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications was always com-
pelled by the Constitution. In the process, it can clothe itself with
an appearance of legitimacy-that it is simply interpreting the
Constitution, not creating one.95
90. See J.E.B., 114 S.Ct. at 1425 n.6; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9; Harris v. Forklift
Systems, 114 S.Ct. 367, 373 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
91. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
92. See id. at 76.
93. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI'TTIONAL LAW § 16 (2d ed.
1988).
94. See Udell, supra note 34, at 560 (arguing that VMI has raised the intermediate
scrutiny formulation close to the strict scrutiny realm).
95. While the Court is busy table setting, the states and federal government are forced
to guess where the Court is really headed in its equal protection jurisprudence. Indeed,
VMI peek-a-boo has already generated speculation among lower courts. See, e.g., Nabozny
v. Padlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that VMI does not employ
"conventional heightened scrutiny parlance" but it is unclear how this affects the level of
scrutiny); Engineering Contractors Ass'n of South Florida v. Metropolitan Dade County,
943 F.Supp. 1546, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (asserting that it is unclear whether VMI signals
greater scrutiny for sex-based classifications). The peculiar wording in the VMI majority
opinion may not be fortuitous. Ruth Bader Ginsburg is well-known for having advocated
strict scrutiny for sex two decades ago and, in fact, drafted the ACLU brief in Reed v.
Reed that urged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny as the governing equal protection stan-
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Given that the Court may be on "the cusp of strict scruti-
ny,'"' it is appropriate to explore how a potentially "exceedingly"
more stringent equal protection standard will impact other areas of
law.9" In particular, the next part of this Comment examines how
VMI could eventually affect the military's combat exclusion laws
and policies as they restrict the role of women in combat. This
focus is particularly appropriate given that the Constitution explicit-
ly grants the President,98 and especially Congress,99 significant
power over the military, but is conspicuously silent as to the
Court's role in military affairs.' Nevertheless, the Court may
have positioned itself, at least in the context of sex, to upset the
role of the other two branches of government in the area of mili-
tary personnel.
III. THE COMBAT EXCLUSION RULES
Women in the military have traditionally been restricted from
serving in combat roles.' In recent years, Congress has modified
dard for sex-based classifications (which, at the time, was only rational basis review). See
Udell, supra note 34, at 525. Such equal protection advocacy of the 1970's is now creep-
ing--consciously and strategically-into the constitutionalism of the 1990's. Id. at 533
(noting that Justice Ginsburg has the same strategic motivations today as in the 1970's).
96. Udell, supra note 34, at 560.
97. See VM!, 116 S.Ct. at 2306 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he enemies of
single-sex education have won; by persuading only seven justices (five would have been
enough) that their view of the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effective-
ly imposed that view on all 50 States").
98. The Constitution vests the President with authority as the "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
99. Congress has even more expansive power than the President. Article I, section 8
provides that Congress shall have power "[t]o raise and support Armies," U.S. CONST. I,
§ 8, cl. 12, "[t]o provide and maintain a Navy," id. at cl. 13, and "[t]o make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," id. at cl. 14. Congress
also has the concomitant power to declare war. See id. at cl. 11.
100. Apart from Article I, section 8, cl. 16, which reserves to the states the power to
raise and train the militia "according to the discipline prescribed by Congress," the Con-
stitution vests all the war power in the President and Congress, subject to the distribution
of power between them. See James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military
Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 210 (1984).
101. The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-625, 62
Stat. 356-75 (codified in 10 U.S.C. §§ 6015, 8549) (repealed), created combat exclusion
rules that prohibited women from being assigned to naval vessels that engage in combat,
10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1988), repealed by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993), and forbade them from flying aircraft
in combat missions, 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1988), repealed by National Defense Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-90, § 531(a), 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991).
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some of the combat exclusion rules1" by permitting women to
fly aircraft in combat missions 3 and to serve onboard naval ves-
sels that engage in combat."° Despite this modicum of change,
however, women today continue to be excluded from the vast
majority of combat positions.'0 5
Under intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny (which, as this
Comment has argued, is equivalent to VMI's exceedingly persua-
sive justification analysis), the objectives served by the government
classification must be advanced to some degree. The precise degree
to which those objectives must be advanced depends, of course, on
which standard of review is chosen. The following sections will
define the objectives of the combat exclusion rules through a de-
scription of the arguments for and against them. It will then test
these objectives under the VMI standard and explore how the re-
sults compare with those under the traditional intermediate scrutiny
approach.
A. Objectives Served by the Combat Exclusions Rules
Several justifications have been advanced to support the combat
exclusion rules. The traditional, and primary, argument against
women in combat focuses on the physical abilities of women. Sim-
ply put, proponents of combat exclusion contend that women do
not possess the same level of physical strength as their male coun-
At the Army's request, Congress gave the Army discretion to promulgate its own policy.
10 U.S.C. § 3013(g) (1988). The Army, acting consistent with the statutory restrictions of
the other branches, drafted a policy excluding women from combat positions. U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Women in the Department
of Defense (6th ed. 1988). The elimination of the "risk rule" in 1994 by Secretary of
Defense Lee Aspin did open up 15,000 positions for women in combat-related capacities,
but they were not direct ground combat units. See James Kitfield, Women Warriors,
Gov'T ExEcuTvE (Nat'l Journal ed., Mar. 1994) (National Security Section).
102. It is widely acknowledged that the impetus for congressional modification of the
combat exclusion rules stemmed from the commendable performance of women in Opera-
tion Desert Storm. See Michael J. Frevola, Damn the Torpedoes, Full Speed Ahead: The
Argument for Total Sex Integration in the Armed Services, 28 CONN. L. REV. 621, 625
(1996); Marrianne E. Dean, Note, Women in Combat--The Duty of the Citizen-Soldier, 2
SAN Dmi o JuSTIcE J. 429, 439 (1994); James D. Milko, Comment, Beyond the Persian
Gulf Crisis: Expanding the Role of Servicewomen in the United States Military, 41 AM.
U.L. REV. 1301, 1326 (1992).
103. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L.
No. 102-190, 105 Stat. 1290 (1991).
104. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
160, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993).
105. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 626.
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terparts.'06 Pentagon studies, in fact, have confirmed that men
possess greater endurance and muscular strength than women.0 7
Accordingly, there is a general concern that women would be
unable to endure the physical rigors of combat and, in turn, could
be overwhelmed by the enemy."0 8
A related argument supporting the combat exclusion rules deals
with pregnancy. °9 Proponents point out that pregnant women
would have to be granted an absence from their assigned duties
that would, in turn, affect military preparedness and effective-
ness."0 It is estimated that ten to fifteen percent of women in the
military become pregnant,"' thus necessitating their eventual ab-
sence as they approach childbirth. Pregnancy may also affect a
woman's ability to perform strenuous tasks while they are still
serving." Moreover, it is possible that the costs involved with
replacing pregnant women"' would be quite significant. Econom-
ic constraints may thus represent an independent argument support-
ig the exclusion of women from combat units.
106. See Paul E. Roush, The Exclusionists and Their Message, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 163,
163-64 (1990); Lori S. Kornblum, Women Warriors in a Men's World: The Combat Ex-
clusion, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 351, 409-10 (1984); BRIAN MITCHELL, WEAK LINK: THE
FEMINIZATION OF TE AMERICAN MIUrARY 156-62 (1989); Jeff M. Tuten, The Argument
Against Female Combatants, in FEMALE SOLDIERS: COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS?
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECIVES 247-51 (Nancy L. Goldman ed., 1982). In
fact, Congress has often expressed its concern over the physical limitations of women and
the consequences of placing them in combat positions. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit
of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499, 531
& n.130 (1991).
107. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, USE OF WOMEN IN THE
MILITARY 26 (2d ed. 1978) (finding that "[w]omen have about 67% of the endurance of
men and 55% of the muscular strength of men").
108. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 636-37.
109. Indeed, critics of the combat exclusion rules readily admit that pregnancy affects
the ability of women to perform their military responsibilities. See Milko, supra note 102,
at 1318 (citing Mady W. Segal, The Argument for Female Combatants, in FEMALE
SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS? HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PER-
SPECrIVES 272 (Nancy L. Goldman ed., 1982)). See also Frevola, supra note 102, at 646
(conceding that "[the concern that women will not be available for combat duty if they
become pregnant is warranted").
110. See Milko, supra note 102, at 1318.
111. See id. at 1317.
112. See id. at 1318 (citing Karst, supra note 106, at 535 n.144). But see Segal, supra
note 109, at 272 (noting that some women can perform strenuous physical activities early
in pregnancy).
113. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 647 (noting "staggering" financial costs).
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Still another justification for the combat exclusion rules con-
cerns combat readiness. It is argued that unit cohesion would be
destroyed if women were assigned to combat units. Male bonding,
it is contended, is a key component for an effective fighting
force.114 The presence of women may "diminish[] the desire of
men to compete for anything but the attentions of women,"" 5
thus resulting in a unit of "rivals in a sexual contest."'1 16 Further,
since bonding is produced through uniformity, the differences in
treatment of men and women would work against cohesion."
17
The bonding process in the entire unit would further be destroyed
since women, it is claimed, do not bond with men or each oth-
er.
118
It is also argued that women cannot function in a combat unit
from a psychological standpoint." 9 Women, it is often claimed,
are passive, not aggressive, emotional, not composed, and nurturers,
not killers. 20 Even if female submissiveness is culturally condi-
tioned rather genetically-imposed, proponents of the combat exclu-
sion rules point out that, even so, "the fact remains that women are
less aggressive.'' Proponents express fears that if women are
subjected to combat stress, they would be far less capable than
males of carrying out their assigned duties" and could actually
suffer psychological breakdowns." As a result, combat effective-
114. See id at 650; Milko, supra note 102, at 1323-24; Pamela R. Jones, Note, Women
in the Crossfire: Should the Court Allow It?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 252, 265 (1993);
Kathy Snyder, An Equal Right to Fight: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Laws and
Policies That Exclude Women from Combat in the United States Military, 93 W. VA. L.
REv. 431, 434 (1990/1991); Tuten, supra note 106, at 252; Segal, supra note 109, at
279.
115. MrcHELL, supra note 106, at 190.
116. Jones, supra note 114, at 265.
117. See id. at 265-66 (explaining the argument that "[e]ven the smallest difference . . .
disrupts bonding" necessary for battle) (quoting Krik Spitzer, Male Bonding, Ground Com-
bat: Are Women Up to it? GANE= NEWS SERV., July 5, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Arcnws File).
118. See id. at 266.
119. MrrCHELL, supra note 106, at 188.
120. See Jones, supra note 114, at 263-64.
121. See Tuten, supra note 106, at 254-55 (suggesting that male hormones may play a
key role in aggression).
122. See Jones, supra note 114, at 253 (explaining the claims of combat exclusionists
"that women would lose their composure on the battlefield and either break down and cry
or abandon their posts").
123. See Robert H. Knight et al. Women in Combat: Why Rush to Judgment, HERITAGE
FOUND. REP., Jun. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File (noting that
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ness would be jeopardized as men would have to come to the
rescue of women.' 24
Finally, proponents of combat exclusion rules advance a pano-
ply of other arguments, including that the American public is not
prepared to deal with female combat deaths,"z and that a cultural
consensus exists over the desire to protect women from the crude
prospects of war.' 26
Thus, the general objective of combat readiness would be limit-
ed by the inferior physical or psychological disposition of women,
the costs associated with adapting to the presence of women, the
damage done to unit cohesion, and societal concerns about female
casualties.
B. Finding a Substantial Relationship: The Arguments
Against Combat Exclusion
The articulation of the government's objective is the first step
in intermediate scrutiny. Once it is defined, the Court will assess if
the means used (here, combat exclusion) are substantially related to
that end. The arguments against combat exclusion mirror how a
challenge to the "substantial relationship" would be framed.
Opponents of the combat exclusion rules challenge each of the
arguments advanced to support the exclusion of women from com-
bat. First, with respect to physical abilities, opponents argue that
even if most women cannot satisfy the military's physical strength
requirements, the combat exclusion rules are overbroad because
they impose a per se exclusion in a setting where at least some
women could satisfy the requirements.127 Women, they argue,
this may have happened to two women assigned to combat-support roles during the Pana-
ma invasion).
124. See Snyder, supra note 114, at 434 (explaining that one argument advanced by
combat exclusionists is that "men would instinctively try to protect [women]").
125. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 642; Milko, supra note 102, at 1322; Christopher
Horrigan, Comment, The Combat Exclusion Rule and Equal Protection, 32 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 229, 257 (1992); Snyder, supra note 114, at 442. Critics, however, point to
recent polls that indicate that the American public supports the introduction of women
into combat on a voluntary basis. See Dean, supra note 102, at 439 n.57.
126. See Jones, supra note 114, at 268. Critics respond that women already become
wounded, killed, or prisoners of war, despite the existence of the combat exclusion rules.
Id.
127. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 639; Jones, supra note 114, at 262; Milko, supra
note 102, at 1314; Snyder, supra note 114, at 433.
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should at the very least be afforded the opportunity to satisfy the
physical requirements.1
8
Some opponents have argued that merely because class statis-
tics reveal that more men than women can qualify for combat duty
based on physical ability, this does not satisfy the substantial rela-
tionship test under intermediate scrutiny. 29  Equal protection
rights are individual rights; consequently, the use of class statistics
to exclude women is improper. 3 ' Because a closer means/ends fit
can be established, the combat exclusion rules are said to be
overbroad.1
31
In any event, opponents argue that the development of modem
weaponry has significantly minimized the importance of physical
strength for combat.12 As a result, "the formerly paramount at-
tribute of overpowering physical strength needed by the warriors of
yore has been replaced in importance by the superior technical
skill, intelligence and training required in modem combat
troops.' ' 133 In short, critics argue, modem technology has become
a great equalizer that eliminates the justification for drawing artifi-
cial distinctions between men and women.
Critics also challenge the argument that pregnancy should be a
disqualifying factor for women in combat. For one thing, men are
not disqualified from combat positions simply because they can
contract illnesses (and thus are forced to miss time on duty); there-
128. See Milko, supra note 102, at 1314. In fact, there may be circumstances where
physical differences actually favor women, such as where effective maneuverability in
constricted areas requires smaller body frames, or where extra fuelage for aircraft carrier
landings favors pilots with lower weights. See id at 1314 n.58.
129. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, Women in Combat: An Essay on Ultimate Rights
and Responsibilities, 28 Hous. L. REV. 503, 527-30 (1991). By contrast, maintaining
security through combat effectiveness and efficiency has never been questioned as an
"important governmental interest." See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (hold-
ing that the "interest in raising and supporting armies is an 'important governmental
interest").
130. See id. at 530 (arguing that "[e]ven assuming that almost all women are not quali-
fied for combat duty, the small number of women who were so qualified could still per-
suasively assert that class statistics should not be used to bar them from the status they
seek").
131. For example, the military could promulgate certain physical requirements that both
men and women would have to satisfy, as opposed to maintaining the absolute exclusion
of women. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 639 (arguing that "[c]urrent regulations permit
some men who are lighter and possibly weaker than women to fill a combat position
merely because they are men").
132. See, e.g., Frevola, supra note 102, at 637.
133. See id. at 637 (footuotes omitted).
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fore critics ask why women should be disqualified simply because
they can bear children.134 Moreover, while pregnancy is the lead-
ing cause of absenteeism among military women,' 35 critics argue
that it is only for a relatively short period of time.'36 Even more
important, men actually miss more time than women on average
each year. 37 During the Persian Gulf War, for example, more
women were able to carry out their assignments than men, the
leading disability among men being, of all things, sports-related
injuries. 3  Finally, critics argue that while some women become
pregnant while serving, policies that exclude all women from com-
bat positions are overinclusive1 39 This overbreadth parallels that
of an exclusion based on physical ability."0
As to the validity of the unit cohesion argument, critics draw
attention to military studies involving sex integration in combat
support units as evidence that the concerns about the destruction of
unit cohesion are overblown. 4' Critics argue that bonding be-
tween men and women in combat units is not only possible but in
fact is enhanced, as it is in any closely associated group, when the
unit shares responsibility under a stressful environment. 42 Critics
also point to the successful integration of men and women in civil-
ian contexts, such as in police and fire departments. 43 If male
134. See Segal, supra note 109, at 273.
135. See Komblum, supra note 106, at 419 n.412.
136. See Jones, supra note 114, at 263.
137. See, e.g., Frevola, supra note 102, at 647.
138. See id. at 648; Milko, supra note 102, at 1319.
139. See Snyder, supra note 114, at 440. Moreover, given the general availability of
birth control and the fact that eroticism is sharply abated during stressful combat situa-
tions, the likelihood of pregnancy during service itself is much reduced. See id.
140. See supra notes 130-131 and accompanying text. In fact, it is argued that when
Congress opened up certain combat positions for women aboard aircraft and naval ves-
sels-positions that are very much affected by pregnancy-Congress undercut its own
argument that the risk of pregnancy justifies the exclusion of women from combat. See
Frevola, supra note 102, at 649-50.
141. See Milko, supra note 102, at 1324 (citing an Air Force Study questioning the
effect that women would have on unit cohesion).
142. See Karst, supra note 106, at 543 (arguing that "[m]ost of what has been called
'male bonding' surely is not different from the close tie that any group of people will
form when they feel a strong sense of mutual responsibility under conditions of extreme
stress!).
143. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 650-51 (noting that "[civilian] organizations have
survived, and even thrived, after the introduction of women into their ranks"); Snyder,
supra note 114, at 434-35 (observing that "there are many female policewomen who are
working everyday with their male counterparts in combat-like situations").
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troops truly have difficulty bonding with female troops, critics
argue, the fault lies with the men and their misperceptions of
women; consequently, it is a problem that men themselves need to
resolve.1" After all, similar arguments about "bonding" were ad-
vanced to prevent the integration of blacks into combat units. 4
Finally, critics charge that theories about women being psy-
chologically unfit to engage in combat are no more than stereotypi-
cal, antiquated notions about the proper role of women in soci-
ety.'" Examples in both military and civilian contexts, they ar-
gue, dispel the notion that women cannot perform in combat-like
situations. 47 Critics further add that, as explained above, the na-
ture of modem warfare demands technical competence before a
"killer instinct."1" For these reasons, some commentators have
argued that the military's combat exclusion rules violate the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, even under intermediate scrutiny. 49  VMI will only
strengthen the challenge.'
C. Intermediate Scrutiny of Sex-Based Classifications After
VMI-Strengthening the Case Against Combat Exclusion
As Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent in VMI, intermediate
scrutiny has never been viewed as requiring the application of a
144. See Jones, supra note 114, at 266 (explaining that if a bonding problem does
exist, "it is not female soldiers' incapacity to bond but male soldiers' perceptions about
female soldiers that lead to the destruction of camaraderie between men and women").
145. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 615 n.178 (adding that the weaknesses of such
arguments is exposed once combat units-whether they be black and white or male and
female-get closer to actual battle).
146. See Jones, supra note 114, at 264.
147. See Frevola, supra note 102, at 652-53 (citing examples from military history as
well as the civilian world to dispel myths about women); Jones, supra note 114, at 264
(noting the positive performance of women in simulated combat and also adding that men
have also suffered psychological breakdowns). But see Tuten, supra note 106, at 252
(arguing that the combat effectiveness of women cannot be accurately measured since it is
impossible to simulate an actual combat environment).
148. Id at 652 (arguing that "[t]he contention that combat troops are, by nature, killers
is ... fallacious").
149. See id. at 632 n.80 (arguing that the combat exclusion rules are invalid under
intermediate scrutiny); G. Sidney Buchanan, Women in Combat: An Essay on Ultimate
Rights and Responsibilities, 28 Hous. L. REv. 503, 541 (1991) ("exclusion of women as
a class from combat positions does not constitute a means that is substantially related to
the government's important interest in raising and supporting armies").
150. To date, the combat exclusion rules have never been directly challenged at the
Supreme Court. See Milko, supra note 102, at 1309 n.42.
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least-restrictive-means analysis.' Rather, only a "substantial rela-
tion" between the classification and the state interest is re-
quired. 52 Thus, the fact that some women could satisfy the phys-
ical and strength requirements for combat positions, for example,
should not invalidate the combat exclusion rules under intermediate
scrutiny. 53 In this respect, the VMI decision may bolster the
equal protection argument immensely by bumping up the analysis
to something resembling strict scrutiny in practice (even though not
formally announced as such).
In VMI, the Court assumed "that most women would not
choose VMI's adversative method."' ' It nevertheless held that
VMI could not constitutionally maintain a single-sex educational
program because there were at least some women--or, as Justice
Scalia speculated, because there was at least one womani t --who
could competently undertake the VMI program. 5 6 The VMI ma-
jority seemed to be embarking on the least-restrictive-means analy-
sis that corresponds with strict scrutiny, or at least something close
to it." Thus, the combat exclusion rules are constitutionally vul-
nerable under the VMI analysis because at least some women could
presumably meet the military's physical and strength require-
ments.1
58
151. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. See id. But see Sunstein, supra note 65, at 75 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny
has already "operated quite strictly 'in fact').
153. It is enough that women, on the average, cannot satisfy the military's physical and
strength requirements. For example, in Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977)
(per curiam), the Court upheld a Social Security benefits scheme that provided higher
benefits to women because "women on the average received lower retirement benefits than
men."
154. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2280.
155. See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that VMI's admissions policy was
held to be unconstitutional "because there exist several women (or, one would have to
conclude under the Court's reasoning, a single woman) willing and able to undertake
VNi's program").
156. See id. at 2281.
157. See id. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for "execut[ing] a de
facto abandonment of the intermediate scrutiny that has been our standard for sex-based
classifications for some two decades").
158. In fact, some commentators have suggested that even if it is true that most women
could not satisfy the military's physical requirements for combat duty, that result may be
due to "a conception of combat duty that embraces physical requirements which are not
truly job-related." Buchanan, supra note 129, at 536. This may be especially true in a
modem military where technical competence is quickly becoming the paramount asset. See
supra notes 132-33, 148 and accompanying text.
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The other arguments advanced to support the combat exclusion
rules are also vulnerable. The pregnancy argument, for example,
was already deficient on two levels. First, while it is true that
pregnancy is the leading cause of absenteeism among women sol-
diers, men actually have a higher absentee rate than their female
counterparts, as described above. 59 Second, even though main-
taining the combat exclusion rules reduces the military's adminis-
trative costs (since the military does not have to adjust to accom-
modate women), the Court has stated that administrative conve-
nience alone cannot constitute an adequate constitutional justifica-
tion under intermediate scrutiny.16' Thus, the pregnancy justifica-
tion may have already been vulnerable to constitutional attack
under intermediate scrutiny.
However, even accepting that genuine concerns exist over the
ability of women to adequately perform their jobs while pregnant,
only ten to fifteen percent of military women become pregnant
while on duty. While under intermediate scrutiny those figures
might justify classifying women differently from men under the
substantial relationship test, the possible emergence of a least-re-
strictive-means analysis of VMI forecloses that possibility. Just as
Virginia could not constitutionally exclude all women from VMI
because some women were willing and able to undertake its educa-
tional program,161 Congress cannot exclude all women from com-
bat positions merely because some women become pregnant. 6
Thus, VMI closes any gap that may have been left open by prior
decisions.
Finally, the arguments dealing with women's effect on unit
cohesion or their psychological make-up are likely to be given
greater scrutiny after VML 63 Even if the government produced
159. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
160. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frondero, the Court struck
down federal statutes, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, that re-
quired a servicewoman to establish that her husband was dependent upon her for support
whereas for a serviceman, it was presumed that his wife was dependent upon him for
support. The Court made clear that sex-based classifications cannot be justified on the
basis of administrative convenience alone. See id. at 690.
161. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2281.
162. In fact, the combat positions Congress has recently opened up to women in both
the Air Force and Navy are very much affected by pregnancy. See Frevola, supra note
102, at 649. Thus, "the argument that a compelling state interest exists due to pregnancy
risk which allows Congress to exclude women from combat assignments is not consistent
with Congress' prior actions." Id. at 650.
163. Some of these arguments were already vulnerable under the older equal protection
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credible evidentiary support demonstrating inherent psychological
differences between men and women, it is unlikely that such evi-
dence would satisfy the government's burden under the amplified
equal protection scrutiny of VML In VMI, at the district court
level, Virginia generated substantial evidentiary support that out-
lined several sex-based psychological and sociological differences
between men and women. In addition, expert testimony also estab-
lished different learning and developmental needs between men and
women.' 64 The evidence was generated to lay a predicate for jus-
tifying a single-sex educational program and to refute any claim
that the state was driven by stereotypes. 65 Cumulatively, the evi-
dence suggested that the adversative model is not suitable to wom-
en and thus VMI's all-male composition is justified. The VMI
majority, however, completely dismissed the evidence, arguing that
courts must "take a 'hard look' at generalizations or 'tendencies' of
the kind pressed by Virginia"' 66 to ensure that states do "not ex-
clude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the
roles and abilities of males and females." ' 167
Perhaps the majority's rejection of the expert testimony was
unwarranted-especially when the evidence was "virtually uncontra-
dicted.' 68 In fact, the United States never even challenged the
expert witnesses. 169 Alternatively, however, the Court's heavy
skepticism may have been more a product of its shifting-and
more demanding-equal protection standard than any of its misgiv-
analysis in cases like Hogan. There, the Court emphasized that intermediate scrutiny must
be conducted "free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and fe-
males [and] [care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself
reflects archaic and stereotypic notions." Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25. Thus, mere asser-
tions that women would collapse under the stress of combat and that men would have to
rush to their sides to save them, or mere assertions that women would adversely affect
male bonding in combat units, for example, would likely be classified as archaic and
stereotypic notions about women's "place" in society under the pre-VMI analysis. Indeed,
Hogan emphasized that intermediate scrutiny must be conducted "through reasoned analy-
sis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assump-
tions about the proper roles of men and women." Id. at 726.
164. See id. at 1434-35.
165. United States v. Virginia, 766 F.Supp. at 1432-34.
166. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2280.
167. Id. (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725). The majority added that "generalizations
about 'the way women are,' estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer
justify denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them outside the
average description." Id. at 2284.
168. Virginia, 766 F.Supp. at 1415.
169. See VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2280.
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ings with the accuracy of expert testimony. Thus, if the Court has
in fact arrived at strict scrutiny after VMI, the combat exclusion
rules are constitutionally infirm under a normal equal protection
analysis. Unfortunately, the analysis is not so simple. A definitive
answer to the equal protection question is not possible without
considering the application of the military deference doctrine. As
will be detailed in the next part of this Comment, conventional
equal protection analysis does not apply to constitutional challenges
involving matters touching upon military affairs.
IV. THE MILITARY DEFERENCE CASES-COLLIDING
WITH VMI
In a series of cases stretching back to 1974, the Court has
struggled with the articulation of a standard of review respecting
the degree of deference the Court must afford Congress and the
President in cases involving constitutional challenges to military
laws and policies.17 The basic justification for such judicial def-
erence stems from a conception of the military as a "specialized
community" that implicates different considerations from those in
the civilian context.17' Accordingly, the Court has recognized that
it must defer to the political branches of government in cases in-
volving military matters because, as was expressed long ago, "judg-
es are not given the task of running the Army."'72 An equal pro-
tection analysis of the combat exclusion rules is thus necessarily
conjoined with the military deference cases.
170. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 24 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975).
171. The Court actually articulated this conception in 1953 when it stated that "[t]he
military constitutes a specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of
the civilian." Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953). The doctrine grounded on
this conception has been alternatively called the "separate community doctrine,"
Hirschhorn, supra note 100, at 178, the "doctrine of military necessity," Stanley Levine,
The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts, 89 ML. L. REv. 3 (1980), and
the "principle of deference," Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers'
Rights: Is the Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465,
466 (1989).
172. Id. at 93-94 (determining that "[tihe responsibility for setting up channels through
which such grievances can be considered and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and
upon the President of the United States and his subordinates").
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The combat exclusion rules have never been challenged directly
in the Supreme Court," primarily because of the perceived futil-
ity in the face of the military deference cases. 74 However, the
combat exclusion rules figured prominently as the backdrop for
Rostker v. Goldberg.75 In Rostker, the Court addressed the con-
stitutionality of the Military Selective Service Act ("MSSA"), a
congressional statute authorizing the President to order the registra-
tion of males-but not females-for military service.1 76 In 1980,
President Carter reactivated the draft and requested that Congress
amend the MSSA to permit the registration of women." Con-
gress refused, however, and several men challenged the MSSA as
unconstitutionally discriminating between men and women under
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 71
Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Rostker,
upheld the validity of the MSSA and reiterated the "healthy defer-
ence" that the judiciary must afford Congress in the context of
national defense and military affairs, as defined in earlier
cases.179  At the same time, however, Justice Rehnquist em-
phasized that judicial deference does not equal total abdication."'
While "the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because
of the military context," Justice Rehnquist argued, "[n]one of this
is to say that Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it
acts in the area of military affairs.'' Justice Rehnquist made his
173. Harrigan, supra note 125, at 251.
174. See Milko, supra note 102, at 1309 n.42.
175. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). The dissent specifically noted that the exclusion of females
from combat positions was not at issue. See id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).'
176. See id. at 59.
177. See id. at 59-60.
178. See id. at 61. The case originally began in 1971 during the Vietnam conflict. See
id.
179. See id. at 66. Justice Rehnquist, for example, cited the several cases since 1974
where the Court, in rejecting constitutional challenges to various military regulations, had
recognized that "the different character of the military community and of the military
mission requires a different application of [constitutional] protections." Id. (citing Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (upholding several provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice against a vagueness challenge under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and an overbreadth challenge under the First Amendment and affording Congress
greater flexibility when dealing with military issues); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976)
(deferring and upholding military regulations banning speeches on a military reservation);
Brown v. Giles, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (deferring and upholding an Air Force regulation
imposing a prior restraint on circulating petitions to military personnel)).
180. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 70.
181. Id. at 68.
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point clear when he addressed the arguments of the Solicitor Gen-
eral who contended that the constitutionality of the MSSA should
be scrutinized under rational basis, not heightened scrutiny, because
judicial deference is mandated in the context of military affairs and
national security.12 Justice Rehnquist responded:
We do not think that the substantive guarantee of due
process or certainty in the law will be advanced by any
further "refinement" in the applicable tests as suggested by
the Government. Announced degrees of "deference" to
legislative judgments, just as levels of "scrutiny" which this
Court announces that it applies to particular classifications
made by a legislative body, may all too readily become
facile abstractions used to justify a result. . . . Simply
labeling the legislative decision "military" on the one hand
or "gender-based" on the other does not automatically
guide a court to the correct constitutional result." 3
Unfortunately, while criticizing the Solicitor General's attempt at
"refining" the test for equal protection as being a superficial ab-
straction, Justice Rehnquist substituted his own superficiality by
failing to precisely articulate how the degree of deference to the
military should be adjusted when applied against the different tiers
of equal protection scrutiny that the Court employs.'84 By this
default, Justice Rehnquist essentially muddied the waters of the
military deference doctrine. Ironically, if VMI is the liberal version
of Supreme Court peek-a-boo in the context of sex-based equal
protection challenges, the military deference doctrine is the conser-
vative version of Supreme Court peek-a-boo in the context of chal-
lenges to military laws and policies.1 5
Perhaps the confusion over the proper standard of review in
Rostker is attributable to the fact that Justice Rehnquist found that
182. See id. at 69.
183. Id. at 69-70.
184. See Bilello, supra note 171, at 488 (noting "[t]he irony of the Court's assertion is
that while the Court was castigating the Government for its 'facile abstractions,' its refusal
to establish a clear standard of review left unanswered the question of what should guide
a court to a 'correct constitutional result"').
185. See Bilello, supra note 171, at 491 (observing that since 1974, "the Court has re-
peatedly failed to formulate a clear and coherent statement of the proper relationship
between the political branches of government and the judiciary in defining
servicemembers' constitutional rights").
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men and women were simply not similarly situated with respect to
registration for the draft. Thus a full equal protection analysis was
never even joined."8 6 In Rostker, Justice Rehnquist argued that
the purpose of registration is to prepare for a potential draft of
combat troops. 7 Since Congress and the Executive had decided
that women would not be eligible for combat positions, Congress
was "fully justified" when it rejected the President's proposal to
authorize their registration. 8 Thus, for the Court to have fully
applied an equal protection analysis in Rostker, it should have
addressed the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules. If the
combat exclusion rules were found unconstitutional, men and wom-
en would be similarly situated. Consequently, limiting registration
to males could violate the Equal Protection Clause. 9 The consti-
tutionality of excluding women from combat positions, however,
was not before the Court and, in fact, the majority seemed to as-
sume the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules.' 9
The Court has continued to apply deference to military laws
and policies in cases following Rostker,'9 and several justifica-
186. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79. Justice Rehnquist noted the similarity of Rostker to
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), where the Court found that "the different
treatment of men and women [in this case] reflects . . . the demonstrable fact that male
and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportuni-
ties for professional service." Id. at 508.
187. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 77.
188. See id. at 79.
189. See Snyder, supra note 114, at 428 ("termination of the combat exclusion rules
would eliminate any basis for exempting women from draft registration since they would
then be 'similarly situated"'). But see Milko, supra note 102, at 1336 (arguing that "[t]he
enactment of carefully-considered legislation allowing for the voluntary assignment of
women to combat positions, but expressly intended not to disturb the existing Selective
Service law, would not invalidate Rostker").
190. See Snyder, supra note 114, at 428 n.64 (observing that "[t]he impression given by
the majority opinion is that the Court just assumed that excluding women from combat
was constitutionally permissible"). Notably, even the dissent assumed, for the purpose of
argument, the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83
(White, J., dissenting) ("I assume what has not been challenged in this case-that exclud-
ing women from combat positions does not offend the Constitution."). See also id. at 87
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (same).
191. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (deferring to the military and
upholding against a free exercise challenge an Air Force regulation prohibiting an ortho-
dox Jew from wearing a yarmulke on duty); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983)
(deferring and holding that an enlisted naval officer could not bring a damages action to
recover for alleged constitutional violations by a superior officer because of the "special
status" of the military). Goldman, the most recent military deference case, did not help
clarify the earlier deference cases. See Billelo, supra note 171, at 491. Interestingly
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tions have emerged to support the military deference doctrine. In
one such case, for example, the Court expressed a separation of
powers justification when it declared that "the Constitution contem-
plated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control over rights,
duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military Estab-
lishment... and Congress and the courts have acted in conformity
with that view. 192 Indeed, power over the military is textually
committed to Congress and the President, whereas the Constitution
is silent about the judiciary's role over military affairs. 93 As yet
another justification, the Court itself has noted that the judiciary
lacks institutional competence when it comes to dealing with mili-
tary affairs, observing that "[t]he complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of
a military force are essentially professional judgments subject al-
ways to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branch-
es."'94 Finally, there is also some evidence that the Framers may
enough, the military deference cases as a whole are of relatively recent vintage, with the
first real articulation of the military deference doctrine in 1974 in Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974). In this respect, the military deference cases share a commonality with
the heightened scrutiny cases for sex-based classifications which owe their own origin to
Reed v. Reed just three years later. What emerges is that just as the Court has been
shifting its equal protection jurisprudence (as culminating "thus far" in VMI) to demand a
higher level of judicial scrutiny of governmental classifications based on sex, the Court
has simultaneously been articulating a standard of review that instructs the judiciary to
afford the political branches significant deference when dealing with military affairs.
192. Chappell, 462 i.S. at 301. At the same time, however, the Court in Chappell was
careful to clarify that "[t]his Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military
personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered
in the course of military service." Id. at 304-05. Justice Rehnquist in Rostker emphasized
a similar theme. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 67 (arguing that "Congress [cannot] disregard the
Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs").
193. On the other hand, the Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. See Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Thus, it has been argued that while the Con-
stitution grants Congress and the President broad powers over military affairs, "the role
played by those branches does not deny the power and duty of the courts to protect the
constitutional rights of military personnel." C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment
Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts," 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 779,
822 (1988).
194. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[lit is difficult to conceive of an area
of governmental activity in which courts have less competence"). Of course, a distinction
should be drawn between the Court's foray into those areas of military affairs that direct-
ly implicate the minutiae of military decision making and the Court's authority over con-
stitutional questions that only indirectly affect that decision making. See Linda Sugin,
Note, First Amendment Rights of Military Personnel: Denying Rights to Those Who De-
fend Them, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 855, 875 (1987) ("There is no principle to explain why the
courts are less able to evaluate the relationship between a military regulation and its pur-
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have believed that judicial deference in the military context is
appropriate. In fact, Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 23
suggested that there should be no limitation on the authority of the
political branches over the military.95
In addressing the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules
in light of VMI, the sex-based equal protection cases and the mili-
tary deference cases present a collision of precedent that is not
immediately resolved, especially when the standards in both lines
of cases are so nebulous. On the one hand, a "healthy" application
of the military deference doctrine could modify-so as to signifi-
cantly lower-the equal protection scrutiny, resulting in the Court
upholding the combat exclusions. On the other hand, it is possible
that the Court would be extremely hesitant and thus decline to
apply the military deference doctrine to a suspect group. After all,
if Congress enacted a race-based combat exclusion rule today, it is
hard to imagine the Court applying the military deference doctrine
so as to preclude virtually any equal protection review.'96 Ulti-
mately, it is unclear how the equal protection analysis would pro-
ceed, especially when the Court so often "substitutes hollow shib-
boleths about 'deference to [the military]' for constitutional analy-
ported aim, than the relationship between a securities regulation and its purported aim. A
substantial review of the merits does not mean that the courts must become military ex-
perts any more than it means they must be scientific experts to decide patent cases.")
(footnote omitted).
195. See THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). There is
strong disagreement over whether the Framers really intended that constitutional protections
apply to the military. Compare Frederick B. Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice, 72 HARv. L. REv. 266, 301-02 (1958) (concluding that the
Framers never intended the Bill of Rights to apply to the military) with Gordon D.
Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 293, 324 (1957) (finding the opposite).
196. True, during World War II in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944),
the Court deferred to the judgment of military authorities and upheld the internment of
120,000 individuals of Japanese descent under a strict scrutiny analysis. However,
Korematsu has been roundly criticized and it is extremely unlikely that the same result
would follow today. See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury,
83 MIt. L. REV. 1611, 1690-91 (1985). On the other hand, in the 1970s during the
debates over the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), a constitutional
amendment that would have subjected sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny, even
some of the most ardent supporters of the ERA suggested that the military could ultimate-
ly decide whether to send women to the front lines in combat. See 118 CONG. REC. S.
9332 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972) (statement of Senator Bayh). And this was a few years
before the military deference doctrine was articulated in Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733
(1974).
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sis."197 What is clear, though, is that VMI has potentially serious
implications for the constitutionality of the combat exclusion rules.
V. THE COURT'S EVOLVING CONSTITUTION: DERAILING THE
POLITICAL PROCESS
The VMI decision represents the Court's most recent disruption
of the political process in the sex-based classification domain-all
carried on under the guise of an evolving "Constitution." It is a
disruption that can be traced back to the 1970's. Some commenta-
tors, for example, argue that the Court's development of heightened
scrutiny for sex-based classifications in the early 1970's, at the
same time that the debate over the ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment ("ERA") was raging, led to the demise of the ERA
because a constitutional amendment was seen as unnecessary after
the Court became involved.' Whether the ERA would have
been ratified had the Court not interfered can never be known, but
what is evident is that the Court essentially derailed both the politi-
cal and constitutional processes!"
197. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. See Allan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on
the Judicial Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 44 n.26 (1993) (claiming that "a
decent argument can be made that but for the development of the intermediate scrutiny
test, the [ERA] would have been ratified').
199. See id. (noting that "the Court's creative activism undermined an important part of
the constitutional and political process'). In fact, Justice Powell, concurring in Frontiero,
in expressing his concern about subjecting sex-based classifications to strict scrutiny, ar-
gued.
There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general catego-
rizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny.
The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of
this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for
ratification by the States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent
the will of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitu-
tion. By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has as-
sumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, func-
tioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed
Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial
action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution
does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). The ERA, of course, would have
instituted strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications, whereas the Court (at least during the
1970's) eventually settled on intermediate scrutiny. See Ides, supra note 198, at 44 n.26.
However, the VMI majority has closed even that gap and has, essentially, written the
ERA into the Constitution by judicial fiat, without having to resort to the amendment
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Regrettably, just as it did in the 1970's, the Court today threat-
ens to derail the political process-this time in the context of mili-
tary affairs. While the balance of power between the President and
Congress has often been the subject of prominent debate, the Court
in the context of women and the military is poised to make that
debate a purely academic exercise. This is a gloomy outcome when
one considers the strong policy arguments on both sides of the
combat exclusion debate, a debate that should play itself out in the
political process. Amazingly, the locus of power today resides in
the judiciary even though the Constitution grants power over the
military to the President and Congress, not the judiciary, and even
though women are capable of influencing the political process-as
evidenced by the recent modifications to the combat exclusion
rules.
VMI, moreover, not only unjustifiably derails the political pro-
cess of today but it also contributes to a line of jurisprudence that
is wholly inconsistent with the constitutionalism of yesterday. The
paragon example of substituting contemporary values for the fixed
principles of the past, as is readily admitted, is the Court's modem
equal protection jurisprudence for sex-based classifications. No one
today genuinely claims that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," ° when it was ratified in 1868, was de-
signed to deal with sexual discrimination, even granting its general
equal protection language.20' Rather, the primary purpose of the
amendment was to deal with the problem of race.202 In fact, the
process.
200. "[N]or [shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST amend. XIV, § 1.
201. See Ides, supra note 198, at 41 (observing that "[nlo one seriously argues that the
purpose or even one of the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent gender
discrimination [but that] [r]ather the incorporation of gender discrimination doctrine into
the Equal Protection Clause was a judicially created extrapolation from the law that had
been developed in the context of race discrimination"). Indeed, just four years after the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld a sex-based classifica-
tion denying a woman a license to practice law, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
130 (1872), thus providing further evidence that the amendment was generally understood
as not speaking to sex-based classifications, at least not in any heightened sense.
202. See Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory:" The Attempted Justification for the
Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 795 (1987) ("there is
no real doubt that the purpose of the equal protection clause was to prohibit certain dis-
crimination by states on the basis of race") (footnote omitted); ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTyING OF AmRICA 180 (1990) ("all commentators are agreed that [the Fourteenth
Amendment's] primary purpose was the protection of the recently freed slaves").
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Fourteenth Amendment explicitly refers to protecting the vote of
"male inhabitants."2 3 Thus, based on the original understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is fair to say that even the
Court's intermediate scrutiny test has no constitutional foundation.
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg and the majority in VMI sought
fit to elevate the level of review to strict scrutiny-or put different-
ly, to have the Constitution "evolve" to strict scrutiny based on
changing contemporary perceptions of the role of men and women
in society.2' 4 However, if the current Court is really bent on re-
evaluating and shifting its sex-based equal protection doctrine, the
real shift should be to rational basis, not to strict scrutiny, as Jus-
tice Scalia in dissent suggested.' After all, it is difficult to
maintain that women, as a majority of the electorate, are somehow
a "discrete and insular minority" entitled to heightened scrutiny
under equal protection review.2 Women are hardly outcasts in
the political process, which "a long list of legislation proves. 20 7
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This provision, in fact, was relied on by the Court
in a nineteenth century case to deny a woman the right to register to vote. See Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874). Although the reference to "male" is in a separate section
of the amendment (section 2), it would be highly incongruous, to say the least, to claim
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to institute heightened scrutiny
for sex-based classifications yet at the same time would deny women a fundamental right
of self-governance-namely, the right to vote.
204. Professor Ides, for example, writing in the context of intermediate scrutiny, de-
scribes the evolution of the equal protection clause as "[taking] place during a time when
social perceptions about proper gender roles were changing rapidly and radically" and that
the intermediate scrutiny test was the Court's response "to conform governmental practices
to those developing mores." Ides, supra note 198, at 41. Apparently, the VMI majority's
attempt to elevate the level of review to strict scrutiny must be a further refinement of
the Court's equal protection doctrine to conform to society's changing mores.
205. Justice Scalia argued that "[t]he Court's intimations [about shifting to strict scrutiny
for sex-based classifications] are particularly out of place because it is perfectly clear that,
if the question of the applicable standard of review for sex-based classifications were to
be regarded as an appropriate subject for reconsideration, the stronger argument would be
not for elevating the standard to strict scrutiny, but for reducing it to rational-basis re-
view." VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "discrete and insular" minority refer-
ence is from United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the famous foot-
note four case, see H. Jefferson Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. RLv.
1087, 1087 (1982) (calling footnote four "the most celebrated footnote in constitutional
law"), where Justice Stone argued that stricter scrutiny may be justified for certain "dis-
crete and insular minorities" because "prejudice [against them] may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities." Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
207. VM, 116 S.Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing long list of legislation dem-
onstrating political power of women).
OUR EVOLVING CONSTITUTION
The recent modifications to the combat exclusion rules following
the Persian Gulf War are just further proof of women's political
influence.
Despite this reality, however, the VMI majority is shifting its
equal protection standard to further narrow the scope of the politi-
cal sphere. Strangely enough, the Court's jurisprudence is upside
down because at the same time that women are becoming more
powerful in the political sphere, the Court's scrutiny is becoming
"exceedingly" stricter in the legal sphere under equal protection. In
the end, VMI aggravates an error the Court made in the 1970's
when it instituted heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.
VMI carries on, and this time strengthens, the Court's practice of
forbidding sex-based public policy choices that are not forbidden
by the Constitution--"the old one, ' ' as Justice Scalia put it.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the Court's recent VMI decision has wide-ranging
implications for sex-based equal protection law, beyond just the
single-sex education context. Given that VM1 marks the Court's
final step to strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications, the consti-
tutionality of the combat exclusion rules is in serious question,
even when paired with the military deference doctrine. Sadly, the
dynamic debate over women in combat threatens to be wiped out
by the Supreme Court, despite the persuasive arguments on both
sides of the public policy issue. Once again, an activist Supreme
Court threatens to derail the political process and further narrow
the sphere of self-government, just as it did in the 1970's when it
first entered the sex-based classification domain-all in the name
of the "Constitution."
STEVEN A. DELCHIN
208. VMI, 116 S.Ct. at 2292 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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